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Chapter 1

Defined Contribution Pensions:
New Opportunities, New Risks
Olivia S. Mitchell and Sylvester J. Schieber

Each month the U.S. financial press reports vast sums of money rushing
into defined contribution (DC) pensions. Pensions known as 401 (k)
plans lead the pack: soon the nation's 401 (k) pension system will amount
to more than $1.5 trillion in assets and will include almost 30 million
private sector employees (EBPR 1996). Recent legislation has extended
the availability of DC plans to the public sector as well, virtually guaranteeing rapid growth of this pension type for decades to come.
This tremendous appeal of defined contribution plans in the United
States is attributable to several factors. For some groups, mainly small and
medium-sized employers, there has been a shift away from defined benefit (DB) to DC pensions, a pattern evident in the left panel of Figure I.
After the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) in 1974, the number of DB plans with fewer than 100 participants grew until the early 1980s, then leveled off for a few years, and
declined steadily after 1987. The number of DB plans sponsored by
larger employers, on the other hand, remained relatively constant over
this same period. The right panel of Figure 1 shows that the prevalence of
DC plans in larger firms grew significantly over the period, from slightly
under 9,000 plans in 1975, to over 39,000 plans almost twenty years later.
But the growth by firm size was uneven: while larger companies were
adding 30,000 defined contribution plans, small employers were adding
nearly 400,000 new plans.
Data on numbers of workers participating in DC plans corroborate
these trends. Figure 2 shows the number of participants in private DB and
DC plans segmented by plan size. The left panel of that figure reveals that
participation in DB plans with under 100 participants has been relatively
flat since just after the passage of ERISA: DB participation grew from 1.6
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Figure 1. Trend in number of private defined benefit and defined contribution plans, 1975-93. Source: USDOL
(1996): 60-61.
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Figure 2. Trend in number ofparticipanls in private defined benefit and defined contribution plans, 1975-93.
Source: USDOL (1996): 63-64.
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New Opportunities. New Risks

million participants in 1975 to 2.2 million participants in 1982, but then
declined to 1.1 million participants by a decade later- below coverage
levels twenty years previously. Participation in larger DB plans grew significantly during the first decade after the passage of ERISA, but has remained relatively constant since then. By contrast, the right panel of
Figure 2 depicts more positive trends for DC plans. Among both larger
and smaller plans, the last 15 to 20 years have seen significant growth in
the numbers of DC-covered participants. Among smaller employers, a DC
plan is often the only retirement accumulation vehicle offered. Among
larger employers, DC plans are often supplemental in nature, augmenting the benefits being provided through traditional DB arrangements.
What are the challenges and opportunities that this DC pension revolution offers? In this volume we take stock of theoretical and empirical
benefits and costs that arise in the DC arena, and we outline some new
concerns as well. This discussion is of critical importance to a wide range
of audiences including potential savers as well as those interested in
helping them save - employers and money managers, policymakers concerned with the health of national retirement income systems, regulators
charged with fashioning a healthy financial system, and members of the
next generation of taxpayers, who are vulnerable to bear the burden of
any shortfalls incurred in retirement savings.

Reasons for Defined Contribution
Retirement Plan Growth
There are several reasons that defined contribution plans have grown so
quickly in the United States and around the world. Probably most importantly, both plan sponsors and plan participants perceive the DC plan as
"flexible." Employees with a DC plan generally contribute a fraction of
their pay; this fraction is often self-determined and sometimes has an
employer match (the match typically depending on the employee's contribution level). Employees also usually have some say over how these
contributions are to be invested during the accumulation phase.
This flexibility is well illustrated by recent U.S. Department of Labor
data on medium and large private sector firms. As Table 1 shows, the
modal number of investment options permitted in a defined contribution plan is about four, with a quarter of plan participants eligible for five
or more. In defined benefit plans, by contrast, the plan participant is
promised a retirement benefit payout, but has no control over his or her
plan investments during the worklife. For example, about half of all DC
plan participants can take employer pension contributions when they
leave their firms, and employees remaining on the job are often able to
borrow against their account balances (Table 2). Also the accounts may
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TABLE 1 Savings and Thrift Plans: Trends in Investment Choices for Full-Time
Participants

Empkryee
contributions (%)

Empkryees permitted to choose investments
Number ofchoices
2
3
4
5
6
7+
at determinable
Types ofinvestments aUawed
Common stock fund
Company stock
Long term interest bearing securities
Diversified stock & bond fund
Government securities
Guaranteed investment contracts
Money market funds
Certificates of deposit
Other
Not determinable

Empluyer
contributions (%)

1991

1993

1991

1993

62

86

91

58

10
20
16

14
29
26

3

12
21
30
15
3
6
7

5

7
13
17
13
3
5
7

56
22
29
17
21
43
27
1
4
3

68
43
42
42
23
43
26
1
6
3

79
46
40
24
30
65
35
2
4
4

49
49
28
33
14
30
20
1
1
3

14

{

18

{

Source: USDOL (1991-93).
Nou: Data exclude supplemental pension plans. Sums may not equal totals because of

rounding.

be withdrawn (albeit with a lax penalty) in the event of a hardship, often
defined as the purchase of a house, high healthcare bills, or college
expenses. Loans for workers who are currently employed at the pensionsponsoring firm are virtually unheard of in traditional DB pension plans.
Flexibility at retirement also is appealing to many DC plan participants. One issue is that participants can decide how much to take in a
lump sum versus how much to annuitize. Almost all participants in pension plans surveyed are able to take some or all of their funds in a lump
sum (Table 3); half may access their money in installments if desired; and
fewer than one-third of DC plan participants may convert their pension
funds to lifetime annuities. This wide range of options contrasts with the
typical pattern in DB plans. where benefits commonly must be paid in the
form of a life annuity.
Recent research on the largest pension plan covering university re-
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TABLE 2 Trends in Provisions for Withdrawal of Employer Contributions Prior to
Retirement, Disability, or Termination of Employment: Savings and
Thrift Plans

Full-time participants (%)
Type offormula

1985

1986

19881

1988

1989

1991

1993

No withdrawals permitted

20

18

29

28

29

50

51

Withdmwals permitted
For any reason
No penalty
Some penalty
For hardship reasons*
No penalty
Some penalty

80
61
30
30
19
14
3

82
56
19
37
26
21
5

71
42
15
26
29
21
6

72
41
14
25
30
22
7

71
37
17
18
34
27
7

50
24
16
8
26
17
7

47
29
NA
NA

18
NA
NA

Source: USDOL (1985-93) and unpublished data from the BLS for 1988t figures. The EBS
sampling frame changed in 1988 to include smaller firms and more industries than before,
so data for 1988 on are not precisely comparable with previous years' tabulations.
*Commonly expressed hardship reasons include purchase or repair of primary residence,
death or illness in the family, education of an immediate family member, or sudden uninsured loss.
tin a few cases the Bureau of Labor Statistics tabulated 1988 results using a sampling frame
similar to that employed in previous years. For comparability purposes these figures have
been presented. where available, under columns headed" 1988," whereas tabulations from
1988 on employ the new, larger survey sampling frame.
Note: Data exclude supplemental pension plans. Sums may not equal totals because of
rounding. NA means data nOl available.

TABLE 3 Trends in Method of Distribution of Account at Retirement: Savings
and Thrift Plans

Full-ti1TU! participants (%)
Type ofdistribution *

1985

1986

1988

1989

1991

1993

Cash distribution
Lifetime annuity
Installments
Lump sum

99
29
59
99

99
25
52
98

97
25
49
95

97
28
52
96

99
30
52
99

99
30
48
98

NA

NA

Stock distribution

Source: USDOL (1985-93). The EBS sampling frame changed in 1988 to include smaller
firms and more industries than before, so data for 1988 on are not precisely comparable
with previous years' tabulatlons.
*Many plans offer more than one form of cash distribution, so sums of individual items
exceed total.
Note: Data exclude supplemental pension plans. Sums may not equal totals because of
rounding. NA means data not available, and "- ,. means less than 0.5 percent.
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TABLE 4 Trends in Employer Contributions in Savings and Thrift Plans
Full-time participants (%)
Employer rnatching* contributions

1985

/986

/988

/989

/99/

1993

12
52
14

28
54

35
47

39
43

11

11

36
47
12

40
46
15

9

7

5

4

3

Fraction ofsalar)'

:=;5%
6%
?7%
Specified dollar amount/other

11

Source: USDOL (1985-93). The EBS sampling frame changed in 1988 to include smaller
firms and more industries than before. so data for 1988 on are not precisely comparable
with previous years' tabulations.
*Ernployces may contribute a percentage of salary lip to a maximum; ceilings on employer
matchinK contributions are generaJly lower.
Nole: Data exclude supplemental pension plans. Sums may not equal totals because of
rounding.., -" means less than 0.5 percenl.

search and teaching faculty (the TIAA-CREF plan) suggests that patterns
of retirement payouts are changing in important ways over time, with
rising demand for 10- and 20-year certain payout periods (Hammond,
this volume). In general, then, employees with DC plans find appealing
the degree of leeway they have over the amount of money paid in, the
investment options during the build-up phase, and the way the funds may
be paid out.
A different appeal of DC plans is the fact that employers are able to
target their matching contributions to reward specific behaviors and specific types of employees. A typical DC pension design has the employer
depositing up to 5 percent of an employee's pay into the DC pension if
that worker contributes the maximum allowed (Table 4). However, ifan
employee chooses not to contribute, or contributes less than the maximum allowed, the company will generally contribute less as well. The
same pattern is evident with company contributions to profit-sharing
plans, where payments are increasingly determined by participants' contributions, rather than by pay levels (Table 5). This approach is probably
designed to allow the employer to effectively pay more to those workers
willing to save more - a practice explained by Richard Ippolito (this volume) as making sense when saving behavior signals greater productivity
potential. Having the match feature in the pension plan allows more
productive employees to be rewarded accordingly.
Economists generally agree that employers' costs associated with the
sponsorship of retirement plans are part of the total cost of labor. That is,
an employer must pay the worker his or her marginal value to the firm,
whether in the form of cash or deferred compensation. Richard Ippolito

8
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TABLE 5 Trends in Provision of Deferred Profit Sharing Plans
Full-time participants (%)
Type ojJormula

1986

1988

1989

1991

1993

59
NA
NA
NA
41

55
16
12
27
45

60
10
18
33
40

52

40
9
32

Employer contributions

Based on stated formula
Fixed % of profi ts
Variable % of profits
Other formulas
No formula

10

{ 24
17
48

60

Allocation ojProfits to employees

Equally to all
Based on earnings
Based on earnings and service
Based on participants' contributions
Other

7
52

26

2
52
13
12
21

19
81

27
73

23
77

I

I

I

61
10

74
12

64
9

8

13

25
75

32
68

II

19
II

Loans from employees' accounts

Permitted
Not permitted

Source: USDOL (1985-93). The EBS sampling frame changed in 1988 to include smaller
firms and more industries than before, so data for 1988 on are not precisely comparable
with previous years' tabulations.
Note: Data exclude supplemental pension plans. Sums may not equal totals because of
rounding. "- ,. means less than 0.5 percent.

argues that this translates into differential economic rewards for different workers when the company offers a defined contribution pension
plan with matching options. In particular, some workers, particularly the
very present-oriented (or "high discounters" in Ippolito's terminology),
do not participate in a voluntary contributory defined contribution plan
even though they forgo the value of the tax benefit or employer match
accorded such contributions. This is sensible when the company feels
that the high discounter may not be workers that such firms wish to
compensate highly in the first place - perhaps because they exhibit behaviors associated with relatively low marginal productivity or perhaps
because they impose relatively high maintenance costs on the company.l
One of the issues that Ippolito leaves unexplored is whether or not
high discounters could, under some circumstances, be converted into
low discounters. Other writers in this volume show that improvements in
financial education could go a long way to encouraging greater saving on
the part of workers (Bernheim, this volume). Likewise, increased employer matching of employee contributions in 401 (k) plans and more
intense communications programs can increase levels of participation in
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voluntary contributory programs (Clark and Schieber, this volume). This
research, then, suggests that some workers are high discounters simply
because they are ignorant of the long-term costs that short-term consumption decisions may imply. Of course other younger, lower-wage
workers may lack the wherewithal to save, which remains a challenge for
the economy as a whole.
An additional explanation for DC plans' popularity is that they are
often perceived as less expensive than the defined benefit alternative.
Data from the U.S. Department of Labor show that joint employer/
employee contribution rates in DC plans are widely variable, ranging in
practice from I to 16 percent of pay (Table 5). Obviously it is possible to
design DB plans that would mimic these cost ranges, so it is not necessarily the case that DC plans are less expensive to operate. On the other
hand, administrative costs associated with DC plans are generally lower
than those of DB plans, making a given dollar of contribution go farther
toward retirement payments. For instance, in 1996, annual administrative expenses in 1996 were $287 per participant in small DC plans while
similar-sized DB costs exceeded $600 per participant (Hustead, this volume). For a large DC pension plan, administrative costs were approximately $49, and for DB plans they were $68 per year in 1996. (These cost
data exclude investment management fees, but include mandatory government insurance premiums for the defined benefit pension plans.)
Edwin Hustead's analysis in this volume shows that the cost ofadministering defined benefit plans rose steadily during the 1980s, both in absolute
terms and in relation to the cost of administering a defined contribution
plan as a result of various legislative and regulatory measures adopted
during that time. These increases in per capita administration costs were
much more significant for smaller defined benefit plans than for larger
ones. In addition to increasing administrative costs, the value of the tax
advantages accorded the sponsors of many small defined benefit plans
were substantially eroded during the 1980s. For many smaller defined
benefit plans, the economic value of continuing them was simply not
worth the cost of so doing.
As a factor explaining their rising popularity over time, proponents of
DC plans have often pointed out that these plans are less risky than the
DB plan alternative. For instance, in the United States, DC plan assets are
owned by plan participants and held in trust, leaving little potential for
loss in the event of corporate sponsor bankruptcy. By contrast, a defined
benefit plan could find itself with assets inadequate to meet promised
obligations, the condition known as underfunding. In the United States,
at least, DB plan underfunding risk is partially covered by a government
insurance group, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, though at a
nontrivial premium cost noted above. In other countries, underfunding
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risk is handled in different ways (Bodie, Mitchell, and Turner, 1997) and
in any event this risk arises only in the DB pension plan scenario, not in
the DC environment.

Do Defined Contribution Plans Offer Reasons
for Concern?
Having explained why DC plans are growing in popularity, we should also
note concerns about this trend. One factor is that defined contribution
pension plans tend to place a great deal of responsibility on participants'
shoulders, more so than in the case of DB pensions. For example, employees offered a DC plan sometimes do not avail themselves of the
chance to save in a tax-qualified account (Hinz and Turner, this volume).
In addition, people who save more in their DC account may offset these
funds with less saving outside their pension account. Nevertheless, empirical studies using nationally representative cross-section data from the
United States are hard-pressed to detect a large and statistically significant result confirming this hypothesis (Gale and Milano, this volume).
Failure to participate in a tax-qualified pension plan may be a rational
economic decision for workers who are particularly income-eonstrained.
On the other hand, for many, nonparticipation may be due to myopia or
lack of information. Data from several large firms show that the amount
and quality of pension information provided to participants by the employer has a powerful effect on pension participation rates, in many cases
even more potent than additional employer funds spent in matching
employee contributions (Clark and Schieber, this volume). Clearly there
is more to be learned about how to interest workers covered by a pension
to actually participate in the plan.
Even when employees do join their company's plan, they are often
poorly informed about investment options, a condition that may lead
them to make seemingly unwise or irrational portfolio choice decisions.
Surveys of average Americans document workers' substantial ignorance
about key aspects of financial markets, raising profound questions about
how ready workers are to make DC investment choices with lifelong consequences (Bernheim, this volume). One instance where questions are
raised is when workers are found to be investing in substantial quantities
of employer stock, perhaps under an incentive plan offered by the corporate sponsor. This investment pattern is not, per se, problematic though
it suggests that employees may not fully understand the benefits of portfolio diversification. Another study, by Andrea Kusko et al. (this volume),
reveals remarkable worker insensitivity to dramatic changes in employer
contributions.
A related issue salient in many plan sponsors' minds of late is that of
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potential liability if employee investments in a DC plan fail to perform
well. This concern has recently resurfaced when a guaranteed investment
contract (GIC) was offered as one of several investment options to participants in a large employer's 401 (k) pension plan. After the insurance
company issuing the GIC filed for bankruptcy, pension plan participants
sued the large employer, charging it with having selected an investment
option that lost money (Ortelere, this volume). This case and others have
prompted the U.S. Department of Labor to issue guidelines regarding
pension investments that employers hope will clarifY their responsibility
toward participants in company-sponsored DC pension plans.
As a result of these issues, pension education is becoming increasingly
important to sponsors of DC plans. Participants vary according to the
types of information they need and can process regarding investment
risk, return, and related issues. Examining alternative approaches to pension education reveals that the way pension information is presented can
have a large impact on pension plan members' investment behavior. For
example, 401 (k) plan participants tend to hold much of their money in
bonds, but appear to move funds to equities after learning more about
the relative risk and return of alternative portfolios (Vanderhei and
Bajtelsmidt, 1997). A related concern is whether unsophisticated investors are likely to overreact when the market falls, manipulating their
pension funds to inadvertently lock in short-term losses when a better
strategy would be to invest for the long term. Available evidence suggests
that mutual fund investors have been rather unresponsive to large downward movements experienced in the market to date, and since many
401 (k) pension plans are invested in mutual funds, it seems likely that
this pattern will also carryover to the DC environment (Rea and Marcis,
this volume).
Several implications flow from increased understanding of how plan
participants make decisions about their pensions. One is that industry is
growing more aware of how to communicate with employees effectively
about their pensions. More forward-looking and technologically advanced firms are exploring the multi-media route, using the Internet and
financial-planning software libraries. Other firms use videos and glossy
materials, along with around-the-clock toll-free telephone service to answer participant questions and permit changes in invesUnent decisions.
As a result, many plan sponsors find their role changing over time as plan
participants interact directly with the customer service representative at
the pension investment house, rather than channeling pension questions
through their corporation's benefits manager (Hurt, this volume). And
benefi ts consulting firms as well as third-party plan administrators are
facing new challenges related to delivering better benefits service at the
retail level.
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The Road Ahead
The rapid growth of defined contribution pension plans in the United
States and around the world offers new opportunities and also new risks.
As we show in this volume, DC plans serve both participating employees
and sponsoring employers. In the process, they are working to educate a
new generation of pension savers. This transition process is far from foolproof, however, and diligent oversight is needed to protect retirement
assets from unwise investment behavior, premature cash outs, and excessive administrative expenses. This volume illustrates how exciting research advances can be used to inform improved decision making about
pension design, particularly for defined contribution plans, in the future.
Note

I. Such a worker also would undervalue the possibility of defined benefit pension at some distant future time, and hence would be unlikely to stay with an
employer that is reducing current cash wages for the traditional pension offering.
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